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Isabel Briggs-Myers and Katharine Briggs developed the MBTI as a system to describe individual personalities by their self-reported traits. Briggs and Myers describe these traits in terms of eight preferences and sixteen types. The U.S. Army has been using the MBTI for individual development and as a research tool since the 1980s. The personalities of people involved in the MDMP are as important as the process itself. Understanding the role of type diversity in staff work will enable leaders to carry out more complete and effective planning.
According to various researchers, effective staff work requires the development and use of cross-functional teams, and the most effective cross-functional teams consist of members who have a variety of personalities. The varied perspectives and alternate approaches provided by a variety of personalities tend to complement each other as teams work toward solutions to staff problems. U.
S. Army doctrine designates what researchers call cross-functional teams as integrating cells. Integrating cells are central to the Military Decision-Making Process.
Failure does not strike like a bolt from the blue; it develops gradually according to its own logic. As we watch individuals attempt to solve problems, we see that complicated situations seem to elicit habits of thought that set failure in motion from the beginning.
Introduction -Detrich Dörner, Logic of Failure
Why do staffs fail? In a controlled environment, sixty-six majors, students from all branches of service, along with inter-agency and international partners, worked together to develop a plan to employ a coalition force in a full-spectrum combat environment. At the end of ten days of effort, the planning product they presented failed to meet even the most basic requirements of their commander. The staff-preferred course of action was neither suitable nor feasible. It was neither acceptable nor complete. The commander was resoundingly disappointed, and the students were left bewildered as to how their combined efforts came to naught.
Were they inexperienced? Each individual student had roughly ten years of experience in his or her individual field. The vast majority of the group consisted of combat veterans, and many had served two or more combat tours. Was their leadership lacking? Some of the most knowledgeable instructors in the military chose the group's leadership. The leaders were hand selected to succeed, not fail. Did dissent or apathy sabotage the group? Again, the answer is no.
This was a professional setting; individual work was on par with what one might expect from a group of this caliber in a 'real world' environment. Morale throughout the event was as high as could be reasonably expected. There was no drama, no fistfights, no 'meet the instructor in the hallway' altercations or conversations. This group of mid-career professionals did their best to accomplish a task for which they had been training at some level for their entire careers. Their efforts were a complete failure.
What happened to this group is a phenomenon called Groupthink. The results were a bitter lesson for the sixty-six individuals involved.
As a practical matter, staff coordination can be terribly difficult. Effective staff work requires the development and utilization of cross-functional teams. The most effective of these crossfunctional teams consist of members with a variety of personality types. The varied perspectives and approaches to problems provided by a variety of personality types facilitate complimentary efforts when teams work to solve staff problems. The predominance of specific personality types in the U.S. Army's officer corps limits the effectiveness of cross-functional teams formed from its ranks. The lack of variety in individual perspectives and approaches to both planning and problem solving inhibit effective staff work by amplifying those conditions that encourage groupthink. University. His description of task-performing teams is similar to the working groups and boards annotated in doctrine, "work teams in organizations have four features: a team task, clear 2 U.S. Army, The Operations Process, [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] Ibid., 2-8. 4 Ibid., 2-7.
Staff Composition and Cross-Functional Teams
boundaries, clearly specified authority to manage their own work processes, and membership effective team players." He goes on to describe this desired diversity in terms of technical expertise, openness to new ideas, willingness to ask tough questions, ability to see the larger picture, and awareness of cultural diversity.
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The U.S. Army agrees that diversity is important. Its doctrine supports the notion that variety is important to teamwork. In its section discussing diversity, Field Manual 6-22 states, "A leader's job is not to make everyone the same; it is to take advantage of the different capabilities and talents brought to the team. The biggest challenge is to put each member in the right place to build the best possible team." When discussing the selection of staff leaders, the manual goes on to say, "A high performing staff begins with putting the right people in the right position."
Additionally, in its chapter on Strategic Leadership, the manual states "As strategic leaders build and use effective staffs, they continually seek honest and competent people: Soldiers and civilians of all diverse backgrounds." 29 Unfortunately, the Army officer corps has been and continues to be largely homogenous.
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Decisions made in the mid-nineteen-eighties about officer personnel management led to the depletion of talent and diversity in the pool of active duty officers. 31 28 Parker, [180] [181] [182] [183] According to a Strategic Studies Institute monograph by Wardynski, Lyle and Colarusso, "this stemmed from a strategic decision to abandon forever the notion of a professional force that could serve as the nucleus of a 29 U.S. Army, Wardynski, Lyle and Colarusso argue for a comprehensive strategy for the U.S. Army's officer corps that includes accessing, developing, retaining and employing talent. This strategy would include a job matching capacity that would shift current practice from "adapting individuals for assignments to matching individuals against assignments." However, if most of the officers available have similar personality types, it is reasonable to assume that most of the teams composed of these officers will be homogenous in nature.
Their argument is that the U.S. Army can best use its people by assessing, developing, retaining and employing them based on individual talent. They assert that continued failure to focus on individual talent imperils the ability of the U.S. Army to defend the nation.
When viewed from the outside, the U.S. Army appears monolithic. External traits tend to reinforce this perspective. Visually, soldiers standing in formations tend to subvert individual traits into an anonymous mass. Regulations decree the similarity in dress and appearance; they measure and regulate levels of fitness and body fat, as well require the use of some substances, while discouraging others. To a casual observer, soldiers look the same, walk the same, dress the same and talk the same. As the observer moves closer, individual differences may appear to be superficial and inconsequential. Even to those familiar with the Army, these differences tend to be seen more as outward statements of individuality that as a window into the individuals 32 Ibid. themselves. Tattoos and loud music proclaim independence, motorcycles and leather jackets portray virility. However, neither fashion nor style constitutes important differences when it comes to individual soldiers. The most important differences between soldiers are those of personality. One way to measure the personality differences of individual soldiers is with the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, or MBTI.
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
The U.S. Army has been interested in the use of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator since the publication of the first MBTI manual in 1985. 34 The U.S. Army War College has used the instrument for more than two decades to help students understand their personal strengths and weaknesses.
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In order to make the work of Carl Jung more accessible, Isabel Briggs-Myers and her mother, In rough terms, the idea is that each individual has preferences along those four lines, and that their personality can be described in terms of the combination and strengths of those preferences.
The preferences are not exclusive. In other words, a preference for sensing as a way of getting information about the world does not mean that the individual does not use his or her intuition.
Instead, it means that individual's preference is for sensing, and that their sensing ability is more developed than their intuition.
It is easiest to understand how these preferences interact by starting with the second preference set, sensing and intuition (Intuition is indicated by an 'N'; an 'I' is used to indicate a preference for Introversion). The S-I preference is about how an individual prefers to perceive the outside world. A sensing preference indicates that a person prefers to focus on the realities of a situation, where an intuitive preference indicates focus on the possibilities that those realities create. Individuals with a sensing preference have developed differently than those with a preference for intuition, and their understanding of the opposite preference is necessarily limited.
In short, the sensing-intuition preference is about how individuals see the outside world. The next set of preferences is about judgment. As they mature, people develop one of two ways of coming to conclusions. One is through a logical process of thinking, and the other is by an appreciation of subjective value, that is, feeling. As with the other preferences, these differences are indicative of levels of preference, they are not absolute. That is, a preference for thinking does not equate to an absence of feeling. Thinkers are not full-blooded Vulcans with pointy ears. Instead, some individuals prefer thinking as an approach to making judgments. The thinking-feeling preference is about how individuals judge the quality of what they perceive.
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The extraversion-introversion preference is about whether a person is more interested in their inner or outer world. An extraverted individual prefers to focus externally, validating themselves and their ideas by interaction with their environment. An introverted individual, on the other hand, focuses on their inner world and is most comfortable validating their ideas within themselves. It is important to remember that the extraversion-introversion preference is independent of the sensing-intuition and thinking-feeling preferences. Individuals with either an external or an internal focus can have any combination of the other three preferences. The introversion-extraversion preference is about how individuals act on the things they are interested in. 40 The final preference, judging-perceiving, is about how individuals interact with the world.
These preferences are the most clearly in opposition to each other. Usually an individual who is using a judging preference has, temporarily at least, suspended his or her ability to perceive. A judging preference indicates a desire for order and decision, where a preference for perceiving 39 Isabel Briggs-Myers with Peter B. Myers. Gifts Differing: Understanding Personality Types, 3. 40 Ibid., 7. indicates comfort with ambiguity. A shorthand way of thinking about this preference is that judging-perceiving is about whether or not an individual made their bed this morning. 41 So, a combination of the four preferences; How an individual sees the outside world, how they judge the quality of what they see, whether they act on the things they are interested in internally or externally, and whether or not they made their bed this morning, describes an individual's personality type. The types are descriptive, not proscriptive. For each person, some preferences are stronger and some weaker. However, when considered together the four-letter descriptors provide a lens into an individual's personality that is potentially very revealing, both to themselves and to others.
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One twist that is often confusing for students of personality type is the effect that introversion has on the outward expression of personality. A person with a preference for Introversion tends to focus his or her other preferences internally rather than externally. In other words, the individual will interact with the external world using their least preferred rather than their most preferred choices. For instance, a person with a strong INTJ preference might appear to the inattentive observer as an ISFP. Ibid., [5] [6] personnel managers may be using personality tests like the MBTI as a crutch to replace their own judgment. Finally, Petersen draws an analogy between personality tests like the MBTI and the world of fashion, and asks "where has the independent and self-confident individual gone?" The researchers noted the overrepresentation of personality types ESTJ and ISTJ, stating, Ideally, a survey could determine the distribution of personality type preferences for personnel currently holding positions as members of integrating cells. As an alternative to such an intrusive and demanding approach, the present research sought data from a representative sample. 48 Gailbreath, Wagoner, Moffett and Hein, "Homogeneity in Behavioral Preference Among U.S. Army Leaders." 49 Ibid., 227, 228.
Graduates of the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course and School of Advanced Military
Studies (SAMS) at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College routinely receive assignments as members of integrating cells. Data from a random sampling of ILE and SAMS students should be similar to data from a survey of those currently holding positions in integrating cells. According to previous research, "homogeneity in leadership may lead to suboptimal decision processes, because fewer 'personality resources' are available to the group of decision makers."
50 If the students, and by proxy, members of integrating cells are found to be homogenous, their efforts may be susceptible to a process known as groupthink.
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Groupthink
Dr. Irving Janis coined the term Groupthink in the early nineteen seventies. In his book
Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, he
provides not only a definition of groupthink, but also a description of how he came to use the term.
I use the term 'groupthink" as a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. "Groupthink" is a term of the same order as the words in the newspeak vocabulary George Orwell presents in his dismaying 1984-a vocabulary with terms such as "doublethink" and "crimethink." By putting groupthink with those Orwellian words, I realize that groupthink takes on an invidious connotation. The invidiousness is intentional: Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group pressures. 52 50 Gailbreath, Wagoner, Moffett and Hein, "Homogeneity in Behavioral Preference Among U.S. Army Leaders," 227. 51 Janis, Victims of Groupthink, 192. 52 Ibid., 9.
Groupthink is a theory that appears several times in U.S. Army doctrine. Department of the Army Pamphlet 525-5-500 describes groupthink as "the antithesis of healthy discourse." 53 Field
Manual 5-0 goes into more detail when it declares "Groupthink is a common failing of people or groups who work together to make decisions or solve problems. It is a barrier to creativity that combines habit, fear and prejudice." 54 Janis describes eight symptoms of groupthink. They are:
These descriptions are complimentary to Janis' theories, and both publications reference his work.
1. An illusion of invulnerability Army. Many soldiers spend the first few weeks of their careers internalizing the lesson that their opinions do not count. For more seasoned soldiers, the expression of dissent has evolved into a veritable art form. Potentially, there are career-ending implications tied to an individual's desire to speak the truth to those in power. Often, those who choose the safer route and remain silent receive an indirect reward. Huntington described the quandary faced by the subordinate who holds dissenting views, "In particular, the subordinate must consider whether the introduction of the new technique, assuming he is successful in his struggle, will so increase military efficiency Taken together, these samples are representative of the U.S. Army's desire to encourage its soldiers that their actions have solid moral groundings. That this moral grounding predisposes them to groupthink is an unfortunate, unplanned coincidence. 56 U.S. Army, [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [4] [5] [6] as to offset the impairment of that efficiency caused by the disruption of the chain of command."
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One final symptom of groupthink that is often present in a military environment is the shared illusion of unanimity. Janis describes this symptom as tied to the self-censorship mentioned above, but occurring as members of a decision-making group struggle to establish and maintain membership and unity within the group. In his discussion of this symptom, Janis states:
These considerations lead many soldiers to a form of self-censorship when dealing with their superiors, either out of fear of potential repercussions, or in a desire to please.
Each individual in the group feels himself to be under an injunction to avoid making penetrating criticisms that might bring on a clash with fellow members and destroy the unity of the group. Adhering to this norm promotes a sense of collective strength and also eliminates the threat of damage to each participant's self-esteem from hearing his own judgments on vital issues criticized by respected associates.
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Junior officers are most likely to experience this symptom when in the presence of their senior leaders. U.S. Army culture encourages junior officers to offer an opinion only when asked, and otherwise to be seen and not heard. This indoctrination leads over time towards the mindset that beliefs or opinions in opposition to the group consensus are not worthy of mention.
The fact that at least four of the eight symptoms of groupthink that Janis describes are extant in the U.S. Army culture is troubling. More troubling is the fact that U.S. Army culture actively pursues the maintenance of those conditions. The more symptoms a group of decision-makers displays, the more likely they are to become victims of groupthink. U.S. Army decision-makers are hamstrung by their culture before they begin. By virtue of their makeup and preexisting culture, integrating cells are predisposed towards groupthink. Leaders of integrating cells are compelled to undertake methods to avoid the occurrence of groupthink, or to find a way to mitigate its effects.
Avoiding Groupthink
Janis offers nine suggestions towards avoiding the groupthink phenomenon. 59 Janis believes an atmosphere of open inquiry can be created if the supervisor responsible for creating the cross-functional team displays an impartial attitude towards the problem the team was brought together to solve. His position is that leaders who avoid tainting the group process with preconceived notions enjoy a wider and more thoroughly considered range of potential solutions. One disadvantage of this approach that Janis points out is the potential for a hands-off approach resulting in a team forming a consensus in opposition to the leader's wishes.
Of the nine suggestions, the five that appear the most useful in a military context are; for leaders to present an initially impartial stance, for the use of multiple independent groups, for the systematic inclusion of trusted associates, for outside experts to validate progress and for the inclusion of a meeting to voice any previously unspoken concerns.
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Along this vein, Hackman advises that the best point for a leader to make corrections to a team's performance is when they are near the mid-point of their work.
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Effective leaders are able to extract from the complexity of the performance situation those themes that are diagnostically significant (as opposed to those that are merely transient noise or that are of little consequence for team behavior). These themes, which summarize what is happening in the group or its context, are then compared with what the leader believes should be happening to identify interaction patterns or organizational features that are not what they could be. Only then is the leader in a position to craft interventions that have a reasonable chance of As to the timing and composition of these interventions, Hackman states: 59 Janis, Victims of Groupthink, 209-219. 60 Ibid., 210-211. 61 Hackman, Leading Teams, 177, 181. narrowing the gap between the real and the ideal. Natural leaders do this intuitively and seemingly without effort.
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In their book Mastering Virtual Teams Deborah Duarte and Nancy Snyder identify four events that signal team leaders that their team is experiencing a midpoint transition: 63 providing direction after their team is more familiar with various issues surrounding the problem, the leader is allowing team members to reach their own understanding of how these issues interact with each other. Limiting direct guidance encourages consideration of wider options.
Another technique Janis suggests to help avoid groupthink is the use of multiple, independent groups when addressing a particular problem. He suggests that using multiple groups would help prevent isolation from contrary evidence. A critical drawback to such an approach is what Janis terms a "let George do it" attitude that presumes that others will do or have already done whatever critical thinking might be required. 67 Janis asserts that periodic discussions with trusted associates can alleviate groupthink by providing both independent criticism and potential solutions. Periodic discussions with trusted associates allow team members to gain a fuller understanding of the various points of view within their team.
The use of multiple groups has potential advantages, but assumes that adequate personnel resources and time are available. Only organizations with adequate resources should attempt using multiple independent teams on individual problems. His observation applies just as well in a military context. Functional cell leaders are typically more senior than their integrating cell counterparts are, and they often hold what amounts to veto authority over integrating cell initiatives. Parker makes it repeatedly clear that 68 Ibid., 213. maintaining the interpersonal relationships between functional and cross-functional team leaders is critical to overall success. 70 Janis also proposes that teams should use outside experts to challenge the views of its members. 71 Janis believed that "Some moderate, institutionalized form of allowing second thoughts to be freely expressed before the group commits itself might be remarkably effective for breaking down a false sense of unanimity and related illusions..."
Outside experts offer the opportunity for fresh perspectives from a respected source, but the team should consult them before they come to a consensus about an issue. Additionally, outside experts are only helpful if they actively participate in the process. For instance, an information brief given to subordinate planners is only useful if it encourages continued interaction between the briefers and the participants, and if it occurs before team members are committed to their individual positions.
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Limits of Groupthink Model and Research
One final technique that Janis believed would fill this needs is what he called a "second chance meeting". This meeting is generally informal in nature and gives every team member an opportunity to express even vague doubts.
Changing the location of these meetings to social settings provides conditions that allow for less formal interaction, encouraging the participation of all members.
The idea of groupthink is not without its critics. Several studies and papers oppose Janis' theory, and many of the studies that support his theories are limited as to the scope of their inquiry. In general, there has been little systematic, empirical research into the phenomena of 70 Parker, Cross-Functional Teams, 97-111. 71 Ibid., 214.
72 Ibid., 219. groupthink.
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Despite the difficulties involved in conducting disciplined, applicable research, the idea of groupthink persists. Clearly, there is something about group processes that occasionally leads decision-making bodies to disastrous results. Until a more complete, more conclusively researched theory is developed and tested the groupthink model will retain its position as the accepted paradigm.
For the sake of simplicity, most research is conducted using students and creating teams from scratch, as opposed to using real-world, previously existing teams. The example mentioned at the beginning of this paper is no exception. The use of students rather than real world practitioners as study subjects minimizes the ability of the researcher to understand the impact of mature relationships between individual team members. The use of newly established teams limits the ability of researchers to understand how team life-cycle issues relate to the groupthink phenomena.
Present Research about Army Diversity
In view of ideas of groupthink and past research into the distribution of Army officer personality types, I developed the hypothesis that:
1. The distribution of U.S. Army officer personality types in its population of students attending the Command and General Staff College in 2009, and by proxy, the distribution of officer personality types in integrating staff cells, would be similar to the distribution of U.S. Army officer personality types in the population of students attending the U.S. Army War College in 1997.
2. An individual officer's personality type would be a predictor of their commitment to the Military Decision Making Process.
3. The distribution of personality types in the Army creates environments in integrating staff cells that are conducive to groupthink.
A short, optional, internet-based survey was presented to a convenience sampling of students at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College's Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and students at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). The survey's intent was to identify the personality types of its subjects, and then relate their commitment to the MDMP.
While the method of data collection was sound, and the rate of response was acceptable, the overall survey results were inadequate to draw conclusive results for all three hypotheses. The survey relied on self-reporting of individual personality type, and so it was possible for individuals to report an incorrect personality type by accident. Future research might diminish this potential for selection bias by including an MBTI assessment or by timing the release of the survey instrument to coincide with the MBTI training of each class.
The rate of response was acceptable but it limited the utility of the survey results. The Command and General Staff College's office of Quality Assurance presented the survey to a total of 232 students, of which, 44 responded. The low response rate (19%) might be attributable to survey overload, as students typically receive several surveys during the course of their studies at CGSC, but have no incentive, outside of professional courtesy, to complete them. Additionally, the structure of the survey precluded a large portion (24 of 44, or 54%) of respondents from consideration with regards to the second hypothesis (personality preference as a predictor of commitment to the MDMP), as it required respondents to recall and report their individual MBTI personality preferences. Overall, there was a consensus among respondents (34 of 44, or 79%) in favor of the MDMP as an effective tool. Respondents also either agreed or agreed strongly to statements like 'the MDMP works' (75%), and "I will rely on the MDMP in the future (84%). Just one in four (25%) of respondents indicated a belief that the MDMP always produces the best solution to problems, and only six of 44 (14%) believe that the MDMP is the only technique they need.
ILE AND SAMS
In 1997, the four most prevalent personality types at the U.S. Army War College were; ISTJ (32.93%), ESTJ (24.33%), INTJ (9.91%), and ENTJ (9.74%). Together, these types represented almost 77% of the student body. In 2009, the four most prevalent personality types at the population as having a thinking-judging preference.
The four corners of the chart that coincide to the thinking-judging preference are indicative of personality types referred to by the MBTI manual as "Logical Decision Makers." 74 All four of these personality types extravert thinking as a preference in an attempt to bring order to their external environment. The goal of people with these personality types is "to create logical order in the external world by making the outer environment rational."
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In addition to a thinking-judging preference, the 1997 War College study also showed a marked reliance in its subjects for sensing-thinking preference. Sixty-four percent of the students in the War College study reported a sensing-thinking preference, more than double the rate (30%)
in the general population. The MBTI manual refers to those with a sensing-thinking preference as "Practical and Matter-of-Fact Types," and notes that they "rely on Sensing for purposes of perception and on Thinking for purposes of Judgment". As conducted, the survey was not adequate for the task intended. A more detailed study is necessary. Longitudinal studies to track the composition of year-group cohorts of officers throughout their careers might prove to be especially enlightening. While an in-depth study over an extended period of time would obviously be extremely difficult in both its initiation and management, the resulting data and its interpretation could have exceptional value. The U.S.
Army is one of the few organizations in the world that could even attempt a work of this scope. 
Conclusion
Groupthink is real. Because of our cultural predispositions, Army officers are especially prone to its effects. Of the eight precursors to groupthink that Janis identified, the culture of the Army actively reinforces four, and is fertile ground for the development of at least three others.
One way to combat the effects of groupthink is to include diverse personalities when undertaking group efforts. Towards this end, the Army seeks diversity in its cross-functional, integrating cell teams. Unfortunately, the pool of officers it draws from for these teams has been and continues to be remarkably homogenous.
Integrating cells are one area where the groupthink phenomena can have serious consequences. These elements of the staff have the responsibility to integrate, analyze and communicate the commander's intent both externally to subordinate units and internally among functional staff elements. The vulnerability of these cross-functional teams to groupthink is an Achilles' heel for the organizations they serve. Poor quality work from integrating cells can easily result in an unclear plan, and a muddled commander's intent.
The method that integrating cells use to analyze problems and develop solutions is the
Military Decision-Making Process. Less than two-thirds of the officers who use this process trust it, and only one in four believe that it consistently produces the best solution to a given problem.
In short, we are using a process that we do not really believe in to produce results that we think are sub-optimal in pursuit of goals that we probably do not understand, let alone possess the ability to communicate.
Indications of a changing distribution of personality type may provide some insight into a way forward. The Sensing-Thinking preference personified by the "nonpersonal analysis of concrete facts" 80 may be giving way to the "logical and ingenious" 81 problem solving of those with an Intuitive-Thinking preference. If this is the case, we should consider appropriate changes to the conceptual tools available to our decision makers. If future commanders are going to have a primarily Intuitive-Thinking preference, they will need tools that compliment "logical and ingenious" 82 problem solving rather than those that support "nonpersonal analysis of concrete facts." Without confirming the results of the current survey, conjecture regarding the MDMP is essentially futile. Radical changes are often radically wrong. The MDMP has a reputation as a reliable process, and it has all the cultural advantages that come with any current paradigm. I am not foolish enough to recommend that the Army scrap a process that has worked for over thirty years. I do suggest that it is time to let the MDMP evolve into something more useful in the current environment. The evidence at hand indicates the topic merits further consideration.
The process is cyclic, and continuous. The emergence of new tools for decision makers is a natural evolution of that process.
Groupthink, on the other hand, is a real and dangerous phenomenon that exists independently of technique. With or without the MDMP, groupthink is seductive, insidious, and dangerous.
Techniques exist with the potential to diminish or eliminate groupthink. The wise leader will remain vigilant against the indicators of groupthink, and with an understanding of the personalities involved, will be ready with appropriate measures to mitigate its effects. 85 
